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Abstract 
 In the UK, Government Inquiries into health and social work failures have 
burgeoned ever more bureaucratic regulatory mechanisms for managing the conduct of 
professionals. This article draws on the concepts of Nudge Theory and Interpretive 
Vigilance to consider the impact upon the social work profession of mandatory 
registration (license) with a regulatory body. The author’s earlier UK based empirical 
qualitative study found that, as a regulatory method, registration had perverse 
consequences contrary to its purpose. A secondary analysis of data identified ‘nudge’ 
points which encouraged social workers to engage proactively with conduct issues in 
the workplace. Risks caused by both active and passive failures of ‘interpretive 
vigilance’ by social workers, who had witnessed concerning conduct of other 
professionals in workplaces, were identified. Criticisms of nudge theory as ethically 
dubious are considered in relation to the transparency of nudge interventions. It is 
proposed that, in the context of international concern about the inefficiency of 
regulation, nudge theory may be a low cost, light touch, local approach to encouraging 
social workers to exercise interpretive vigilance to conduct related risks and to take 
active collective ownership of conduct management in the work place.   
 




A review of 468 abstracts from the 5th European Conference for Social Work 
Research (ECSWR) 2015 shows that social work as a profession continues to strive to 
be more effective, to understand more fully the breadth and range of our international 
remit and manage the complexities of our work for the benefit of the service users with 
whom we work. Key themes linking presentations include the impact of reforms on 
practice arenas, the management of risks in practice and the central relevance of ethics 
to our profession. Implicit to these themes is a recognition that we are an imperfect 
profession: In seeking to do better, we recognise that we do not always do as well as 
we might.   
Few papers at the conference discussed the regulation of social work, which is 
surprising, as regulatory mechanisms are arguably at the nexus of such themes and a 
key method of risk management. By regulation, I am referring to the legal frameworks 
imposed by governments and the rules that prescribe professional conduct. In many 
countries such frameworks also provide what Strom-Gottfried and Manning (2015) in 
their excellent conference paper call ‘strategies for corrective actions’. Regulation 
creates duties upon us and gives us responsibilities: we must be qualified in a particular 
way, act in the best interests of service users and in accordance with a code of ethics. 
The following of an ethical code, it has been suggested, inevitably leads to an 
‘enactment of ethical care’ (Stanford 2009, p218). Banks (2013, p587) suggests a 
‘creative tension’ between personal engagement with ethics in the workplace and 
professional accountability. She suggests this as a space for the exercise of 
professional wisdom, with an implied positive outcome. In addition, social workers are 
regulated through country specific laws and through policies and frameworks 
impacting on the practice arena. Rules are imposed upon social workers as a 
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mechanism to manage risk and guide towards practice approved by Governments. This 
process goes wrong to a greater or lesser degree with concomitant degrees of harm 
(Meleyal, 2011, McGivern & Fischer 2012). A review of the most recent (2014) 
Fitness to Practise Report of the current regulatory body for social work in England 
(The Health and Care Professions Council, or HCPC) evidences that, of the 16 
professions regulated, complaints against social workers were proportionally the 
second highest compared with other professions. Complaints upheld include 
inappropriate relationships with service users, fraud, theft, and incompetent practice.   
Whilst the regulatory arrangements across Europe differ from country to country 
most have a mandated method of holding social workers to account and codes of ethics 
against which standards of practice are measured are remarkably similar across nations 
(Hussein, 2011). They mirror the International Federation of Social Workers statement 
of ethical principles (IFSW, 2015) and are likely to result in similar kinds of conduct 
issues being investigated. In the UK, Government Inquiry Reports into health and 
social work failures leading to the deaths of service users such as the Shipman and 
Climbié cases (Smith, 2005; Laming, 2003) and outcomes from Serious Case Reviews 
into the deaths of children by their carers such as the Connelly and Pelka cases 
(Department for Education 2010; SSCB, 2013) have heralded calls for ever more 
expansive regulatory frameworks to manage the conduct and practice of professionals 
with the both explicit and implicit implication that more rules would help to reduce 
risks.   
However, there is significant concern internationally about the unintended 
consequences of professional regulation (Bianculli et al. 2015). Policy makers, 
politicians and indeed regulated practitioners have expressed concern about whether 
professional regulation is a disproportionately expensive response aimed at a minority 
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of rogue and ineffective practitioners but impacting adversely on the majority (PSA, 
2015).  Questions have been raised about whether regulation does any good at all 
(Baldwin, 2006) or a disincentive to safe and good quality practice (Meleyal, 2011). In 
the context of austerity measures internationally, policy makers are actively seeking 
alternatives to traditional models of regulation (European Commission, 2015;World 
Bank, 2015). The UK based Professional Standards Authority have been influential in 
promoting ‘right touch’ regulation – that is, targeted, proportionate and minimum 
regulatory force to achieve high quality health and social care environments (Cayton, 
2010). ‘Right touch’ approaches have garnered international support but as yet, there 
have been few discussions of what ‘right touch’ regulation of social work might look 
like or how it might be achieved.  
This paper proposes that two behavioural approaches have much to offer in 
developing ‘right touch’ regulatory strategies in social work. Drawing upon a 
secondary analysis of data from my earlier study into English social workers’ 
responses to becoming registered (Meleyal, 2011), this paper firstly considers nudge 
theory (Thaler and Sunstein, 2010; Sunstein, 2015). ‘Nudge’ has its origins in 
Behavioural Economics and is an approach used to influence the environment in which 
choices are made.  Secondly the paper will draw upon a model developed in relation to 
the aircraft industry: ‘interpretive vigilance’ (Macrea, 2007; 2014).  With the exception 
of Critical Path Analysis drawn on for practice based resource management or post hoc 
case scrutiny, risk management in social work does not, for the most part, draw upon 
theoretical and practical risk management strategies used in heavy industries such as 
aviation, nuclear and chemical manufacture. This is surprising, as these industries 
spend billions of dollars, pounds and yen on researching, understanding and managing 
risk (Hood et al., 2004) creating knowledge which has much to offer social work. 
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Finally I will suggest that in the UK context of a profession which is strained by 
austerity and demoralised by attacks from government and the media which have left it 
unsure of its future, these combined approaches may be a method of engendering 
active and positive collective engagement with conduct management in the workplace.  
The regulatory context 
Regulations are legal frameworks imposed by governments that are a  
by-product of imperfection (Orbach, 2012), put in place to ensure a benign outcome 
that might not otherwise occur.  In relation to social work regulation, many nations 
have legislative and/or policy rules which define expected conduct and provide a 
method for managing the process of ensuring that the required conduct is followed. 
Regulation limits and constrains social workers’ ability to act as individuals or groups 
necessarily want to, it creates duties upon professionals and gives us responsibilities 
for managing ourselves.  
In the UK regulation is a key tool chosen to improve the quality of services and 
strengthen public protection, and is presented as a safeguarding mechanism against 
possible risks caused by rogue or incompetent practitioners (DH, 1998). It is 
acknowledged that the majority of social care staff carry out their work safely and with 
humanity (DH, 1998; Social Work Task Force, 2009); nevertheless enforceable 
standards of conduct against which practitioners will be held accountable are applied to 
the whole profession. This, it is suggested, strengthens public protection. However, 
research and theoretical literatures indicate that the relationship between the imposition 
of regulatory rules and desired outcomes in practice is not a straightforward dynamic 
and that the aims of regulation can be corrupted by regulatory resistance, ritualistic 
compliance and performance ambiguity (Ashworth et al., 2002; Meleyal, 2011; 
McGivern & Fischer 2012).  
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There is international concern about the impact and cost of regulation. Europe is in 
the midst of austerity measures impacting upon social and health care delivery but 
regulation is expensive. One estimate suggests that UK health and social care 
regulation annual operating costs may be as much as £600 million (PSA, 2015).  In this 
context a number of influential organisations have been mandated by European 
Governments to propose effective and cost effective regulatory reforms (OECD, 2012; 
World Bank 2015). Professional regulation in the UK was reviewed by the Law 
Commission (2014), reporting inefficiency in the form of inconsistency and 
duplication between and across professional regulatory bodies. The Government 
response to the review was arguably more strongly worded and implicitly critical than 
the report, advising that professional regulators must develop proactive, proportionate, 
effective and efficient regulatory mechanisms in a timely manner (Department of 
Health, 2015). Some English social workers have started to raise questions about the 
social work regulatory body in relation to its effectiveness at achieving its aims and the 
financial costs to them. Fees are currently £80 per annum (approximately €110) for 
which they report feeling no benefit to either themselves individually, or the profession 
(Schraer, 2014). Social work researchers have raised concern about the imbalance in 
power between the regulator and the individual social workers in fitness to practise 
cases and that private lives of individuals are unjustifiably intruded upon by regulatory 
requirements and processes (McLaughlin, 2010). Others have suggested that regulatory 
processes such as fitness to practise, in their focus on the individual do not allow for 
consideration of broader structural and organisational impacts on service provision and 
so operate inefficiently (McLaughlin et al.2015).  In August 2015 the UK Professional 
Standards Authority proposed that UK regulation of health and social care is no longer 
fit for purpose and is in need of significant reduction and re-design (PSA, 2015). In 
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January 2016, British MP Nicky Morgan announced further regulatory reform. This 
will include a new regulatory body for social work, the third new body for social work 
in the past six years following the scrapping of the first regulator, the General Social 
Care Council in 2010.   
 
Outliers, mavericks and bad apples 
Almost without exception UK Health and Social Care Inquiries and Serious Case 
Reviews (SCR’s) draw attention to the inadequacies of whichever regulations are 
current at the time. Clearly Dr Harold Shipman, murderer of at least 15 patients, and 
Beverley Allitt, a nurse convicted of the murder of four children in her care, were 
subject to not only the laws of the land but also regulatory rule expectations about the 
behaviour required of the professionals involved: They chose to ignore both. The 
General Medical Council and the Nursing and Midwifery Council were subsequently 
required to address regulatory approaches to recruitment, screening, and the sharing of 
information (HMSO, 2007) in the hope that this would reduce the likelihood of further 
such events occurring. Regulators were required to consider the professional training 
curricula for health and social work practitioners as a consequence of the Inquiry into 
the murder of Victoria Climbié, an eight year old child, at the hands of her carers 
(Laming, 2003). Serious Case Reviews (SCR), such as that relating to the death of 
Peter Connelly (Baby P) suggested that the child was failed by the professionals who 
were charged with his care (LSCB, 2009). The review report found that professionals 
did not follow policy guidelines about the conduct of child protection processes, nor 
did staff identify that they were inadequately trained to participate in such 
interventions and fulfill their statutory role. Somewhat unusually, the SCR following 
the murder of Daniel Pelka, a four year old boy at the hands of his mother and her 
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partner (SSCB, 2013), did not seek to apportion professional blame (although the press 
were very ready to do so). However, a subsequent survey by the British Association of 
Social Workers revealed that, whilst the purpose of SCR’s is to learn vital lessons, 
25% of social workers interviewed never read SCR reports, whilst 67% of respondents 
to that survey ‘only sometimes’ got to read recommendations (Cooper, 2013). This 
seems disappointingly at odds with the social work duty to ‘keep professional 
knowledge and skills up to date’ and ‘act within the limits of your knowledge, skills 
and experience’ as is specified in the HCPC Standards of Conduct, Performance and 
Ethics (HCPC, no date: p3).  
Industry too is concerned about when things go wrong.  In social work practice 
some service users die. Any death is devastating and should not be diminished by 
comparisons but, when things go wrong in industry, the scale of death is potentially 
catastrophic and financial costs may run into billions of pounds. The disaster that 
unfolded on Three Mile Island in 1979 when a fission reactor went into nuclear 
meltdown remains one of the most serious nuclear accidents recorded. The site remains 
radioactive some 36 years after the event although, fortunately, the full potential 
impact of the meltdown did not happen. Despite also being a regulated industry subject 
to intensive inspection regimes, deficiencies in human performance lack of training, 
the possibility of substance use impairing fitness for duty, and failures of 
communication were found to be some of the contributory causes to what happened 
(US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2013).   
A similar element of human fallibility is apparent in relation to pilot Andreas 
Lubitz flying an airliner into the Alps in 2015, killing 150 people.  The US and EU  
Aviation Safety Agencies require airlines to carry out checks to ensure the safe piloting 
of aircraft. Every pilot is subject to annual medicals and, whilst low mood would not 
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prevent a pilot from flying, a history of serious mental illness will almost always lead 
to the loss of the pilot’s licence (Bor, 2015). A subsequent investigation suggested that 
the fear of losing his licence to fly, thus effectively ending his career, was the key 
reason for Lubitz hiding his mental ill health from his employers (Birnbum and Faiola, 
2015).  
Despite the very different operational environments, clear overarching themes of 
each of the cases above are notable. Firstly, there was an abundance of regulations and 
rules governing expected behaviours. Secondly, across a number of different contexts, 
the same types of rules governing behavioural expectations fail to achieve the requisite 
outcomes over and over again (Meleyal, 2011). Thirdly, recommendations to policy 
makers and regulators following critical events in each setting tend to be uniformly 
similar: that the technical abilities of individuals and their training must be improved, 
and supervision and/or monitoring must be more robust. The focus is on seeking to 
understand what went wrong and what can be learned. This largely retrospective 
approach relies on the benefit of hindsight. Regulatory theorists (Lodge & Wegrich 
2012; Baldwin & Cave 2012; Hood et al. 2004) suggest that seeking to understand 
what goes wrong in case analysis begins from a false premise: that regulation assumes 
individuals are uniformly interested in and capable of modifying their own behaviours 
in line with imposed rules, and does not take account of those who respond 
strategically or perversely to regulatory requirements.  
Just as in society, all regulated environments will inevitably have the potential for 
outliers, mavericks and bad apples. Efforts to account for mavericks add increasing 
numbers of layers to rules and regulations which make the regulated arena ever more 
opaque, complex, contradictory and confusing to follow and therefore less likely to 
achieve the aims of regulation.  A more nuanced approach to understanding how 
 10 
individuals respond to regulations seems necessary. 
 
Growing international interest in nudge theory 
For some time the UK Government has recognised that whilst the majority of 
public policy aims to change or shape behaviour, legislation and regulations which 
compel us to act in certain ways may be effective to a greater or lesser degree, and are 
often costly to implement and deliver (Cabinet Office, 2009). In particular, it has been 
recognised that command regulation which demands that people adhere to rules, is 
ineffective at changing minds. However, it is also understood that, even when 
individuals are given good quality information, they do not always make rational 
choices. For example, people continue to smoke though adverse health impacts are 
well known. The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), known as the ‘Nudge Unit” was 
established by the UK Government in 2010 to develop new, effective, less burdensome 
and lower cost ways for government to shape behaviour, with a particular focus upon 
changing the choice architecture (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009), that is the environment 
within which we make decisions and respond to cues (Cabinet Office, 2009; p8). It is 
mandated to find non-regulatory means of achieving behaviour change. Though 
privatised in 2014 the unit continues to have formal partnership arrangements with UK 
government departments, the National Health Service, regulatory bodies, police forces 
and banking institutions. The United States and Australia each have a BIT unit; the Air 
Osservatorio is an Italian research centre disseminating nudge research; Denmark has a 
Nudging Network of researchers and policy makers interested in behavioural 
approaches in policy making; and nudge theory has influenced policy development at 
the European Commission, in Singapore and in Canada (Ly & Solman 2013). Nudge 
theory is gaining considerable interest internationally and is influencing policy in 
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relation to national security, crime initiatives, climate change, organ donation, value 
for money in governance and fraud.  
 
Methodology 
This paper draws upon a secondary analysis of a qualitative data set (Meleyal, 
2011). Nineteen interview transcripts from the original grounded theory study were 
reviewed. Each was a record of an interview with a social worker in practice in 
England. Initially practitioners known to me were recruited and these suggested others 
who might be willing to participate. Interviews were originally conducted to elicit the 
perceptions of social workers on the positive and negative impact(s) of the (then new) 
statutory requirement to register, for both the individuals and the organisations in which 
they work. That study found that publicity about the outcomes of registration conduct 
cases triggered a negative allegiance to registration with respondents passively avoiding 
engagement with conduct matters in the workplace. Rather than registrants actively 
choosing not to be vigilant, they appeared to ‘turn a blind eye’ to breaches of 
professional conduct. Although the earlier study was too small to generate robust 
generalisations for the profession, its findings do resonate with those from other 
professions that regulatory rule impositions can create perverse incentives to comply 
(McGivern & Fischer, 2012).   
Secondary data analysis can be used to view data from a new perspective or 
conceptual focus but it must be underpinned by an assessment of the fit between the 
primary dataset and the secondary research questions (Heaton, 2004).  The influence of 
the original convenience plus purposeful research sampling strategy was considered for 
secondary data analysis. As in the original study, no suggestions of representativeness 
can be made for secondary analysis but because of the fit between original and 
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secondary questions the analysis was a valid approach. Long-Sutehall et al. (2010) 
propose that both the research questions for secondary analysis must be close to the 
original, and that the analytic techniques used should be similar. Both injunctions have 
been followed here. Two of the original research questions were used to underpin the 
secondary data analysis. These were: a) Is registration supported by registrants and, if so, 
why?; and b) how, if at all, would registrants use regulatory requirements as a quality 
assurance mechanism themselves? However the focus of the secondary analysis was 
more nuanced than the original and more selective regarding the data on which it drew. 
In relation to the first question, the secondary analysis focused specifically on the ‘why’ 
aspect, with specific reference to what Thaler and Sunstein refer to as ‘the choice 
architecture’ (2009, p10). Transcript data which referred to explanations for behavior and 
environmental or contextual influences were isolated from the collections of transcripts 
and analysed in micro detail both individually and collectively.  Nudge theory was used 
as a conceptual framework to identity the mechanisms through which social workers had 
been encouraged and supported to engage with regulatory rules. The 2011 analysis had 
already identified the ways the ways in which participants would and would not use 
regulatory requirements as a quality assurance mechanism (question 2). The original 
study did not seek evidence of interpretive vigilance but the process of ‘turning a blind 
eye’ could be interpreted as an indicator of risk. Examples of ‘turning and blind eye’ 
were also isolated from transcripts and a focus of analysis. Hence the potential costs of 
failures of (interpretive) vigilance became a key focus of the secondary analysis, with a 
particular focus upon the context and behaviours described in respondent interviews.  
Ethics 
The original 2011 study used grounded theory to analyse data and whilst it is an 
iterative process the secondary re-visiting of data was not a ‘refinement over time’ of the 
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original study (Heaton 2004, p3). The secondary study, unlike the first, sought to 
consider the relevance of specific theories to the data set, rather than allow themes to 
emerge from data. The original study was approved through the University of Sussex’s 
Research Ethics Panel process. It was not feasible to re-contact original participants but 
informed consent for the secondary analysis could not be presumed (Long-Sutehall et al. 
2010). Further ethical clearance was sought through the university which had provided 
clearance for the original study. This confirmed that the close fit between the original 
and secondary research focus allowed for secondary analysis and reporting of findings. 
 
Nudges towards regulatory compliance in social work practice 
Nudge theory draws primarily on behavioural economics to explain why people 
behave the way they do, and suggests ways that the environment of choice can be 
structured to lead people to make different choices. Key theorists Thaler and Sustein 
(2009: p8) define nudge as ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives’. Nudges are methods to achieve rule adherence 
through a process of influencing decision making. To count as a nudge, the 
intervention must be Easy to implement, Attractive in design, Social in how it 
encourages people to make a commitment to others, and Timely, prompting people 
when they are most likely to be receptive. The BIT unit refers to these imperatives by 
the acronym EAST (BIT, 2014). Nudges should not forbid activity but should be 
designed in such a way that it is very easy to adhere to.  An example give by Thaler 
and Sustein is encouraging healthy eating, not by banning sugar but by placing fruit at 
the checkout counter of supermarkets. 
 My 2011 study had found that social workers did not respond to being regulated 
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in the way that had been intended; some responses showed that the opposite of the 
aims of registration as a mechanism to protect the public were being achieved. These 
included defensive and risk avoidant social work practice, such as following the rules 
easiest to follow, and refusing to be creative with rules or less likely to bring them into 
arenas where they may have to do something about it, an example of which would be 
failing to notice colleagues’ bad practice. My original report, detailed the factors which 
increased motivations towards and engagement with regulation, regulatory codes and 
conduct matters in the workplace. This secondary analysis focuses more specifically on 
the elements of the choice architecture, the nudges, which appeared to influence their 
engagement with regulatory requirements in the workplace.   
Data revealed that workplaces and managerial leads have a key role in the 
generation of what McGivern (et al. 2015) call ‘formative spaces’ within which social 
workers have the opportunity to actively engage in consideration of regulatory policy, 
conduct, competence and their values in relation to practice. Formative space 
generation was generated through different types of intervention, each operated on 
different levels of depth. Some nudge interventions were related to local design with, 
arguably, subliminal persuasive influence such as screen savers showing the name of 
the regulatory body bouncing across the screen when the computer was not in use.   
Several work places displayed social workers’ registration certificates: 
“our certificates are in the foyer – we see them soon as we walk in, so 
do service users of course”.   
 
Social workers in these settings reported feeling “proud” of their registration: display 
of their certificates was an important part of ‘belonging’ (to the profession, to their 
team) and evidenced an outward facing manifestation of beliefs about the importance 
of openness for the benefit of service users. Some workplaces had log books where 
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team members were invited to write down things that “don’t quite work or don’t make 
sense or something we have a problem with”.  This respondent noted that the approach 
of her manager was key in the use of the log book:   
“The manager made her expectations very clear, she expects us to look 
out for problems … and they are followed up with a no-blame 
attitude”.   
 
The log book was discussed monthly. Three workplaces had meetings to discuss what 
one social worker called ‘values challenges in practice’. Baldwin (2014, p833) refers to 
this as ‘information mechanisms’ which draw upon social influence.  Team meeting 
and individual supervision were important formative spaces for all respondents to the 
original study. Where team meeting and supervision specifically addressed challenges 
in workload, rather than a simple audit process, and where opportunity was presented 
to discuss challenges in a team context, anxiety was reduced, and commitment to 
‘professionalism’ was enhanced. By sharing information across the social work team 
about values challenges in practice, subtle messages were also conveyed about the 
ways group members are expected to feel, think or act as professionals in that context. 
Another respondent gave an example of social influence in relation to a poster his 
manager had put on the wall. The poster said “we don’t say ‘we aim’ here - we say ‘we 
will”.  Social workers in the same team reported that the poster was motivating in 
encouraging alertness to good practice and had influence ‘beyond the obvious’. An 
example given was that new recruitment choice was influenced by the team ethos and 
who would ‘fit’ within it.  
A further nudge toward formative space generation for this sample was in the 
creation of warnings and reminders (Sunstein, 2014).  In one team each computer had 
a small label which said ‘remember your code of ethics’ attached to the keyboard.  A 
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social worker said it reminded her about not sending “those kinds of emails”, and 
clarified that she meant the kinds of emails sent without enough thought. One team 
manager was in the process of having the log-in screen of the teams’ electronic file 
system changed to require confirmation of commitment to the professional code of 
practice in use of the data base. Whilst it can be argued that these initiatives might 
become invisible with routine use over time they do present users with small pauses for 
thought.   
Respondents in these environments reported strengthened personal commitment to 
the underpinning purpose of regulation and seemed less challenged by it. Conversely, 
in workplaces which did not positively engage with regulatory requirements related to 
conduct expectations, feelings of apathy, indifference and vulnerability were reported 
which in turn had a negative impact upon how they engaged with conduct issues in the 
workplace.  They were less positive about the regulatory body and were least likely to 
raise a conduct issue in the workplace or with the regulatory body (Meleyal, 2011).   
A key aspect of the success of these nudges is that they addressed the social aspect 
of influence. What information mechanisms had in common was that managers in the 
workplace used the power of in-house networks to encourage people to engage and 
make a commitment to each other. The attitude manifested and encouraged was ‘this is 
important to us as a team’. Attention was given to developing a team culture where the 
collecting of information about what went wrong or the ways things could be improved 
was not seen as burdensome but about the team working together to be the best it could 
be.  The drive of the team manager was influential in developing such local nudges 
towards team norms which influenced individuals’ commitment to working with social 
work codes of practice and meeting expected regulatory standards.   
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Interpretive vigilance and risk management 
My 2011 research found that the environments which had a positive approach to 
engaging with regulatory rules and conduct expectations in the workplace were also 
those which had clear systems and processes in place which encouraged identification 
of places where risks may occur (log books, for example). Macrea (2014) calls this 
‘interpretive vigilance’, advising that the workplaces best at this are those which have 
developed a culture which supports and encourages staff members to take active and 
personal responsibility for improving the service. Drawing upon his research in the 
airline industry and ‘near miss’ incidents, Macrea (2014) suggests that developing 
systems of interpretive vigilance is a key component of the development of 
organisational risk resilience.  Risk resilience is about an organisation’s ability to 
protect its operations from the small mishaps which can combine to create a major 
catastrophe, what Sparrow (2008) refers to as a process for sabotaging harms. 
Importantly, though, airline industries go beyond an analysis of what actually 
happened, to analyse incidents for what might happen - they have invested in focusing 
on ‘distant misses’ (Macrea, 2014). This is a process of anticipatory discovery rather 
than post incident discovery of risk which has allowed for the range of what might be a 
risk event to be hugely expanded. The process involves an examination of the ‘space’ 
between a near miss and what it is coming near to (Macrea, 2014). Distance in this 
model is provided by the human, social and technical controls that are in place (ibid. 
p11), each of which is closely examined. The fact that a system or process is in place is 
not assumed to be good enough. The notion is simple: work with the distant misses and 
the near misses become less likely. By extension, the big risks become even less likely 
to happen. A key element of interpretive vigilance is the explicit and deep appreciation 
that not everything can be known. We cannot set rules for everything and that the 
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majority of risk assessments are based on limited data, specifically, that which is 
already known. To imagine that we have considered all possible aspects of any 
situation blinds us to the problematic possibilities of new developments and maverick 
attendance to rules or guidelines. Interpretive vigilance suggests that ‘emerging risk 
can and should be identified by piecing together cues in apparently inconsequential, 
minor, ‘small’ events’ (Macrea, 2007:12). Additionally and importantly, that this 
should be done ‘early – that individuals in any system should be encouraged to look 
for risk cues. Risk cues might be found through a process of case discussion (in 
formative spaces perhaps), the active interrogation of current models, processes, or 
cases, and the patterning of events.  The novel facets or any risk incidents should be 
given particular scrutiny (ibid., p13). 
Secondary analysis of my 2011 data looked for examples of interpretive vigilance 
in respondents’ narratives. Log books, used in two teams were an example but these 
were to identify problems to be ‘fixed’; there was no team notion of ‘working through’ 
items to consider the further possible hazards of the problems and or risks identified. I 
did not therefore find examples of interpretive vigilance of the model as presented by 
Macrea.  However, I did find data which suggested a lack of risk resilience, and 
respondents reported issues which might be identified as potential near misses: that is, 
points of risk which may be an early warning of possible bigger risks in the future. 
Such ‘near miss’ points of risk are also noted in the Inquiry reports mentioned earlier 
in this paper. Long before Dr Shipman’s arrest on murder charges it was known that he 
had experienced a drug problem and fraudulently issued prescriptions (HMSO, 2007). 
Before baby Peter Connelly died, a whistleblower had questioned the competence of 
Haringay Social Services to address concerns about the service made following the 
death of Victoria Climbié in the same authority (Community Care, 2008).   
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The secondary analysis identified two near miss arenas. The first indicated that 
interpretation of regulatory requirements depended upon whether it was related to 
expectations in professional or private domains. Problematic alcohol use was discussed 
by seven respondents and each was clear that using alcohol at work was not 
acceptable, However, they felt that alcohol use in a private domain was not their 
concern and, importantly, even if they believed problem alcohol use was impacting 
upon someone’s work performance (i.e. smelling of alcohol poor performance), 
respondents would not raise it either with their management team or the regulatory 
body.  One respondent explained: 
 “I would turn a blind eye.  It is not my job to social work colleagues”.    
 
This view was supported by others who said that they were influenced by the norms of 
dominant others within the workplace which created a culture in which it would be 
considered inadvisable to raise concerns about the conduct of others because of 
perceived possible negative outcomes for the concern raising individual (for example, 
having own practice scrutinised, being ostracised by colleagues).    
A second related theme identified was in relation to ‘playing by the book’. 
Respondents spoke of their positive perceptions of the profession of social work as 
being adaptable and creative in their commitment to provide a good service in the 
context of limited resources. However, they spoke of feelings of loss and 
disappointment in relation to a perceived loss of freedom to be creative in the context 
of diminishing resources. Four respondents reported fear of regulatory intrusion into 
their own lives in both private and professional domains and in this context they chose 
not to practise creatively.  
 It is suggested that ‘turning a blind eye’ and ’playing by the book’ in social work 
are points of near/distant risks which may be indicative of greater potential risks in the 
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future and each could be fruitfully explored using the interpretive vigilance framework.  
Conclusion 
Nudge theorists suggest that, in order to influence others, we must present options 
that make it easy for those we seek to influence to be influenced; ensuring that such 
influenced behaviours are beneficial to the individuals is a key strategy for achieving 
this. (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009; Sunstein 2014b). A clear finding from my small scale 
2011 study was that workplaces which had transparent conduct management 
procedures, a workplace culture of support and a positive non-blame approach to 
accountability led to individuals feeling more confident about their role in relation to 
managing conduct issues in the workplace. This secondary review of data enabled the 
identification of clear examples of work-based nudges which, although simple and 
unsophisticated, had a contribution to the facilitation of such a culture which positively 
influenced social workers to engage with conduct issues in the workplace. It is 
however important to note that neither the original sample nor the secondary analysis 
can suggest generisability to a wider population,  Findings presented here are a 
contribution to and support a view that the architecture of a work environment may 
influence social workers  engagement with the requirements of regulatory frameworks. 
Macrea’s work (2014), developed in the airline industry, provides a useful 
framework for considering the space between a near miss and a risk incident which 
may have useful application in social work settings by making us more alert to 
identifying and acting in relation to risk potential. 
In conclusion this paper proposes that in the context of international concern about 
the inefficiency of regulation, the application of nudge theory may be a low cost, ‘right 
touch’ local approach to encouraging social workers to exercise interpretive vigilance 
to conduct-related risks and to take active collective ownership of conduct 
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management in the work place leading to better decision making and safer practice. It 
is further proposed that a profession which through regulatory means is facilitated and 
engaged in exercising greater local regulation of conduct issues and risk management 
in the workplace is in a stronger position to develop the profession from within and 
influence policy makers positively about how the profession develops. As such 
protecting the public interest is served without the need for ever more behomothian,  
expensive regulatory frameworks. 
However, an important caveat must be sounded. Thaler and Sunstein (2009) 
suggest that nudge theory has, at its heart, a libertarian paternalism which directs the 
choices others make in an undercover, inexplicit manner. In respect of the management 
of risk, those with the power to select the choices which they are seeking to nudge 
people towards presumably believe that these are the ‘right’ choices to be made. In that 
regard nudge might be considered a utilitarian method: the ‘good’ ends justify the 
manipulative means. However, Baldwin (2014) alerts us to the ethical issues in relation 
to this: What if the selectors and directors are mistaken or unethical and the choices 
lead to malign outcomes for some individuals or communities?  Whilst Thaler and 
Sunstein assert that the agent is left with a free choice, when influence is hidden, true 
choice is violated; only on reflection might an individual be able to understand how 
they had been influenced. Some nudges may be so manipulative as to prevent 
reflection or evaluation (White, 2013). Clearly the ethics of nudge use in social work 
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